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Abstract This study reports on action research efforts
that were aimed at developing institutional arrangements
beneficial for soil fertility improvement. Three stages of
action research are described and analyzed. We initially
began by bringing stakeholders together in a platform to
engage in a collaborative design of new arrangements.
However, this effort was stymied mainly because condi-
tions conducive for learning and negotiation were lacking.
We then proceeded to support experimentation with alter-
native arrangements initiated by individual landowners and
migrant farmers. The implementation of these arrange-
ments too ran into difficulties due to intra-family dynamics
and ambiguities regarding land tenure. Further investiga-
tions to find out how ambiguities could be tackled revealed
that the local actors themselves had taken initiatives
towards developing institutional innovations to reduce
ambiguities. However, there is still considerable scope for
further development of these self-organized innovations.
The article ends with a reflection on inter-disciplinary
action research, where it is argued that making ‘‘mistakes’’
is an inherent and necessary characteristic in action
research that aims to address complex social issues.
Keywords Action research  Ghana  Land tenure 
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Introduction
In a developing economy such as Ghana, access to land and
natural resources is important for improving the livelihoods
of poorer groups. Farmers’ livelihood decisions with respect
to cropping strategies and labor input are strongly influenced
by land tenure arrangements (DFID 2000). Several authors
(Gavian and Ehui 1999; Gavian and Fafchamps 1996; Fraser
2004) argue that contractual arrangements such as land
renting and sharecropping reduce incentives to invest in soil
fertility management due to tenure insecurity. Gavian and
Fafchamps (1996) reported that tenure insecurity leads
farmers to divert soil-enhancing resources to more secure
fields whenever possible.
In an earlier study (Adjei-Nsiah et al. 2004), we also
found an association between tenure insecurity among
migrant farmers especially and limited attention for
regeneration of soil fertility. We showed that in Wenchi
only native farmers could own land and therefore have
secure tenure. This allows them to use long-term rotational
strategies such as rotations involving cassava and pigeon-
pea to improve their soils. On the other hand, migrants who
settle in the communities to farm cannot own land and
hence appear to depend mostly on short-term rental or
sharecropping arrangements. This prevents them from
using rotations involving long duration crops such as cassava
and pigeonpea. Instead, they rely more on rotations with
short duration crops such as cowpea and groundnut to
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enhance soil fertility. At the same time, however, migrants
tend to continuously crop the same piece of land to maize
for two years in both the major and minor seasons in order
to get the maximum from the land, thus mining the soil of
nutrients. Due to this, the landowning natives often accuse
the migrants of degrading their lands, which in turn makes
them reluctant to rent land to migrants beyond two years.
Migrants cite tenure insecurity and high cost of land rent as
reasons for not investing in soil fertility regeneration. Thus,
it appears that there is a widespread lack of trust between
the migrants and the natives. Natives do not trust that when
they rent land to migrants for a longer period, they will take
good care of it. Migrants on the other hand are afraid that
when they invest in soil fertility, they will not be allowed to
reap the full benefit. As is elaborated further on, the social
dynamics around land tenure and soil fertility are more
complex than portrayed above since the relationships
between different categories of migrants and the natives
vary in meaningful ways (see also Adjei-Nsiah et al.
2007a). Nevertheless, it is clear that the current configu-
ration has negative consequences for soil fertility and
productivity in Wenchi.
These social complexities around land tenure and their
associated problems are not unique to Wenchi and Ghana,
but have been reported elsewhere in Africa as well (Lavigne
Delville et al. 2001; Neef 2001; Le Meur 2002; Saı¨dou et
al. 2005). Several studies provide evidence of a relationship
between land and/or tenure security and soil fertility decline
(Gavian and Ehui 1999; Gavian and Fafchamps 1996;
Fraser 2004). In this context, access to land and security of
tenure are seen as important means through which food
security and sustainable development could be attained in
Africa (ECA 2004). At the same time agricultural science
has been criticized widely for contributing little to allevi-
ating problems of small farmers in Africa, including the
combating of soil fertility decline (Bie 2001; Brader 2002;
Stoop 2002; IAC 2004). It has been argued that scientists
often operate in an isolated, disciplinary, and un-engaged
manner, which leads them to come up with solutions that
are badly adapted to the social and agro-ecological condi-
tions in which farmers operate (Chambers and Jiggins 1987;
Stoop 2002). Another important aspect of such critiques is
that scientists have tended to develop technical solutions
mainly, while disregarding and/or failing to address social
complexities such as those around land tenure. Inspired by
such critiques, we choose to work with an inter-disciplinary
research team and work in an action research mode. On the
bases of the initial findings presented above, we concluded
that our action research efforts should not remain only in the
sphere of developing better technologies and management
practices together with farmers. In order to deal with the
social dilemmas and complexities around land tenure, we
decided to work on the social realm as well, and engage in
the joint design of institutions through negotiation of, and
experimentation with, new kinds of contractual and/or land
tenure arrangements (Adjei-Nsiah et al. 2004). This idea of
working on institutional arrangements is in line with recent
insights in innovation studies which suggest that social
conditions needed for the uptake of technology should be
regarded as an integral component of an innovation, and not
as an ‘‘external’’ factor influencing adoption of innovations
(as e.g., in Rogers 1983). Innovations are increasingly seen
as consisting of a balanced whole of ‘‘hardware’’ (technol-
ogy), ‘‘software’’ (human mindsets and modes of thinking),
and ‘‘orgware’’ (new rules, market arrangements, forms of
organization, etc.) (Smits 2002; Geels 2002). At the same
time, the idea to work on institutional arrangements can be
seen as relevant addition to well-known methodological
strategies to making agricultural research more relevant to
resource-poor farmers, most notably Farming Systems
Research (FSR) (see Collinson 2000) and Participatory
Technology Development (PTD) (see Van Veldhuizen
et al. 1997). In both FSR and PTD the tendency has been to
work on the design of new and/or more appropriate tech-
nologies rather than on social conditions (Leeuwis and Van
Dan Ban 2004).
In all, this article reports on action research efforts
aimed at developing ‘‘orgware’’ beneficial to soil fertility
improvement. The focus hereby was on the design of more
favorable land tenure arrangements among natives and
migrants in Wenchi and on answering the question of what
alternative tenure arrangements might ameliorate the ten-
sions and social dilemma between migrants and natives. In
the conclusion of the paper we draw lessons on action
research that extend into the social realm, since generating
insight on this novel approach was an additional scholarly
objective of the study. In this research line, we discuss
factors that led to the failure of the attempts that were made
to negotiate and experiment with new/alternative forms of
arrangements.
Land tenure in Ghana
As a background to the research, we highlight some rele-
vant aspects and issues regarding land tenure in Ghana,
whereby we move from more general characteristics to
specific circumstances in our research area.
The continued dominance of customary institutions
In Ghana land is an index of political power in the country’s
ethnic communities (Addo-Fening 1987) and struggles over
land are not just struggles over an economically valuable
resource but rather constitute arenas of simultaneous
struggle over wealth, power, and knowledge (Berry 2002).
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Often conflicts over access to a particular tract of land are at
the same time related to struggle over who has the authority
to decide how the land is to be allocated and used and on
what basis (Berry 2002).
Traditionally, control over access to and use of land in
the country lies either in the lineage or the ruling families
rather than individual families (Fred-Mensah 1999). Among
the Akans, the chief is the custodian of the land while
among the non-Akan people, land is administered by the
lineage heads. Families have gained rights and use of land
by their residence and political allegiance to the ‘‘stools’’
(literally the chairs that leaders sit on). Individuals, on the
basis of their membership of family or a lineage group, also
have usufruct rights over communal, family or lineage land.
Marriage is another important institution through which in-
married spouses gain secure access to land.
Despite the many attempts that have been made to inte-
grate all forms of tenure into single statutory and common
law framework since 1986, land tenure in Ghana is still
largely regulated by customary institutions (Crook 2005). In
Ghana, initial rights to land are generally established through
clearing the bush and first occupation. The individual who
first cleared the land and his descendants retain a pre-eminent
right over it and can grant temporal or extended right to
others. Migrant farmers and/or those who do not have suf-
ficient access to land usually gain access to land through
various forms of tenancy arrangements such as renting,
sharecropping and taungya (a system whereby the forestry
commission of Ghana gives land out to tenant farmers to
grow their food crops while they plant and tend trees for the
commission) (Amanor 1994; Migot-Adholla et al. 1994).
However, rules governing access to land are ambiguous
and people’s claims to land are closely linked to membership
in social network and participation in formal and informal
politics (Berry 1993). The social relations between tenants
and landlords are of great importance in terms of ensuring
continuous access to land and arrangements. To obtain and
maintain access to valuable resource like land, people invest
in social relationships by contributing items such as food,
drinks, gifts, and ritual offerings during ceremonies such as
marriage, funerals, and festivals. In addition to ceremonies,
farmers also invest in social relationships by contributing to
community projects and organizations such as home-town
improvement unions, religious associations, and self-help
groups (Berry 1993).
Land tenure evolution in Wenchi district
Wenchi district is characterized by the presence of different
ethnic groups, the majority of which are migrant farmers
from the northern part of Ghana. The district has histori-
cally attracted a lot of farmers from the northern part of
Ghana in search of suitable place to farm because of its
abundant natural resources, particularly land in the past.
Wenchi, the district capital, is strategically located because
it is the first major town encountered when one is traveling
from Nandom or Wa (the original homes of most of these
migrants) to Kumasi, the second largest city in Ghana.
Wenchi is also close to Techiman, one of the fast-growing
marketing centers in the West Africa sub-region where
there is strong demand for high-valued food crops like
maize, yam, and groundnut. Originally, migrant farmers
gained access to farmlands by presenting drinks and a
salutation fee to the chiefs who then allocated land to them
from which they were allowed to clear as much land as
they could (Amanor 1993). Later, in the early 1940s, when
more people moved into Wenchi in search of fertile land
for the cultivation of crops such as cocoa, the traditional
council issued land to migrants on the basis of Abusa or
collected annual tributes (Amanor 1993). In Wenchi, an
Abusahene (Chief responsible for managing natural
resources in the traditional area) was created to manage the
renting of stool land to migrants. In the early 1960s the
central government banned the traditional council from
raising revenues in tributes and instead introduced an
annual fee (Amanor 1993). Once the annual fee was paid,
the migrant could clear as much land as wished in the area
allowed. Currently this fee stands at ¢200,000.00 (US$22)
annually or an equivalent of one 100 kg bag of maize.
As the migrant population increased, newcomers began
to enter into various forms of land tenure contracts with the
natives. These contracts have evolved from a system
whereby migrants obtained land in return for services
rendered, towards more monetized interactions such as
sharecropping and land renting. In the period when land
was in abundance and the population was low, landowners
often gave their land out for sharecropping. However, as
the monetary value of the land increased, most landowners
began to rent out their land to migrants instead of entering
into share contract. This monetary value has increased by
the circumstance that families and individuals owning land
have become more interested in cash along with the greater
role of money in the economy at large. Monetization of
land has also increased in view of population increase and
the influx of farmers from the Upper west region coupled
with commercialization of agriculture. For instance, people
need money to pay for emergency expenditures such as
medical bills, funeral expenses, court cases, and shelter.
Tensions between natives and migrants in the research
area
The study took place in three nearby communities in
Wenchi district which are located about 5–7 km away from
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Wenchi along the Wenchi-Techiman road. The farmers in
these communities have been involved in action research
trials in soil fertility management since 2003, after a
diagnostic study revealed the existence of intriguing prac-
tices and beliefs regarding the role of cassava in soil
fertility management (Adjei-Nsiah et al. 2004). The com-
munities which are made up of natives (80%) and migrants
(20%) have a total population of about 3,750, the majority
of which are farmers. The natives who are the landowners
are Akan speaking Bonos while the migrants are made up of
four ethnic groups, namely the Walas (50%), Dagarbas
(30%), Lobis (10%), and Mossi (10%). A further explora-
tion of diversity in the research area (Adjei-Nsiah et al.
2007a) revealed that the various ethnic groups differ with
respect to history and context of migration, duration of stay,
and the nature and quality of relationship with the local
communities. For instance, while Mossi, Lobis, and
Dagarbas migrated into the communities between the 1940s
and 1960s, Walas started migrating into the communities in
the early 1990s. And while earlier migrants have developed
long-standing relations with the natives and regard their
stay as permanent, Walas tend to view their stay in the
community as temporal and repatriate a considerable part of
their income to their home of origin. In comparison with
other migrant groups, Walas tend to have relatively large
farming enterprises and seem to be relatively successful in
economic terms (Adjei-Nsiah et al. 2007a).
In the research area, tensions around land tenure have
arisen in particular between the native Bonos and the
Walas. As mentioned in the introduction, Bonos tend to
accuse Walas of degrading the soil on land rented out to
them, while Walas claim that the high rents and advance
payments demanded by Bonos prevent them from hiring
land for longer periods and leave them no choice but to
exploit the land to recoup the money invested. In addition,
they complain that landowners will not allow them to reap
the benefits of investments made in soil fertility on land
that is rented for shorter periods (Adjei-Nsiah et al. 2004).
Also in other areas tensions have risen between natives and
Walas. Natives dislike that Walas are putting up thatch
roofed houses in the community which—according to the
natives—makes the community look ugly, while at the
same time Walas repatriate income from their farming
activities back home to reinvest. Natives have on several
occasions threatened to no longer allocate plots for house
construction to Walas. In some occasions, Walas have been
dragged to court or brought before the village committee
by the natives with the least provocation, often resulting in
fines being imposed on the Walas. Some migrants have had
their sheep and goats poisoned by natives after the animals
strayed into natives’ fields. These hostilities by the natives
tend to be interpreted by the migrants as jealousy of their
hard work and success in their farming activities. In short,
the relations between Bonos and Walas are tense and
unhealthy and go along with accusations and stigmatization
from both sides (see also Adjei-Nsiah et al. 2007a).
Action research methodology
Due to the social dynamics occurring in and around the
action research, efforts to work towards more favorable land
tenure arrangements had to be re-oriented several times. In
view of these changes, the research journey can be seen to
have three main stages. Each stage is characterized by
specific objectives, approaches and research methods. More
details about these are provided below. In short, in stage 1
we tried to use multi-stakeholder platforms as forums for
negotiating alternative tenure arrangements. In stage 2, we
monitored experimentation with alternative land tenure
arrangement initiated by two pairs of landowners and tenant
farmers. In the stage 3, we made investigations into insti-
tutional problems associated with land tenure and emerging
institutions to deal with these problems. All field research
was carried out by the first author. Reference to his activi-
ties in the description of the three stages will be in the first
person from hereon.
Stage 1: Discussing land tenure in multi-stakeholder
platforms
Research approach and methods in stage 1
From the start of the collaboration, on-farm experimenta-
tion with farmers on different cropping systems and rotation
strategies was an important component of the action
research, and this remained so throughout the research
period. These experiments took place together with three
mixed groups of farmers with each group consisting of
between 11–16 farmers. Altogether the experimental group
consisted of 18 migrants (two Lobis, five Dagarbas, and 11
Walas) and 21 native farmers plus the local agricultural
extension agent. Some of the native farmers were also
opinion leaders, unit committee members (which is the
lowest rung in the decentralized formal administrative
structure of the government of Ghana), and sub-chiefs in the
communities. Only one migrant was a member of the unit
committee representing the migrants. This group carried out
all experimental activities and served at the same time as a
platform to discuss the outcomes of the research, including
findings regarding land tenure. The group (from now on the
‘‘experimental platform’’) met in the field on a bi-weekly to
monthly basis.
In addition to this experimental platform, a second plat-
form was created from the outset with the prime purpose of
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ensuring that research findings would not remain within the
group of participating farmers. This second platform inclu-
ded various stakeholders in the agricultural sector in the
district and met once in every three months to discuss the
activities of the action research program being carried out
with the farmers. These stakeholders included chiefs, sub-
chiefs from the three communities, agricultural extension
agents, farmers, representatives of NGOs, and farmer-based
organizations and opinion leaders. Officially this higher-
level platform consisted of 25 members, but as meetings took
place in the community there were often more people
attending, including farmers from the experimental plat-
form. In practice, this meant that attendance was normally
between 40 and 60 people. I asked a local senior official
associated with the Wenchi District Assembly to facilitate
and chair the first meeting of the platform, and he was asked
by the group to continue his efforts in subsequent meetings.
During the platform meetings, I acted as a resource
person and stand-in facilitator. At the same time, I acted as
a ‘‘participant observer’’ who monitored and documented
the dynamics in the platforms for PhD research purposes.
When the initial experiments and subsequent discussions
on the outcomes in the experimental group revealed the
existence of tensions on land tenure, I decided to try and
use the already established platforms in order to discuss,
negotiate, and design alternative land tenure arrangements.
This strategy was informed by a popular body of literature
which suggests that multi-stakeholder platforms can con-
tribute much to resolving complex problems and conflicts
regarding natural resources (Ostrom 1990; Ro¨ling and
Jiggins 1998; Maarleveld and Dangbe´gnon 1999; Steins
and Edwards 1999). Essentially, the idea behind this is that
such platforms can contribute to conflict resolution by
providing a space for exchange of perspectives, dialogue,
and learning (Bawden 1994; Pretty and Chambers 1994;
Berkes and Folke 1998; Ro¨ling and Wagemakers 1998),
which in turn might lead to the identification of common
objectives, understandings, and creative solutions.
Results in stage 1: The failure to sustain a constructive
dialogue
During the first year of experimentation, positive effects of
rotations with mucuna, pigeonpea, and cassava became
evident (Adjei-Nsiah et al. 2007b). However, most of the
migrants argued that the prevailing land tenure arrange-
ments in the community would not allow them to apply
these practices to improve the productivity of their land.
From that period onwards, several suggestions were made
by both migrants and natives in the experimental group
about possible alternative land tenure arrangements that
would encourage migrants also to apply these management
strategies.
Most of the suggestions made by the migrants required
that, to enable them to use cassava and pigeonpea to
improve the soil, landowners should reduce the land rent
for the period that these crops would be occupying the plot
to the barest minimum if not struck off altogether. Most of
the landowners, however, were of the view that even if the
land is given to migrants at zero or reduced rent to enable
them to cultivate cassava or pigeonpea to improve the soil,
they would still use the land to grow maize since income
from pigeonpea and cassava is poor compared with maize.
Hence, they argued that the type of arrangement proposed
by migrants would only work if it went along with clear
agreements about the crops to be grown, including sanc-
tions in case of violation. Even if disagreement remained,
discussions in the experimental group were held in a
relaxed and peaceful atmosphere initially and members on
this platform expressed their opinions freely. These con-
structive discussions ended, however, some time after the
issue of land tenure had become an issue for discussion in
the higher-level platform.
As the higher-level platform was regularly informed
about the results of experiments as well as on progress in the
experimental platform, the issue of land tenure became an
issue for discussion there too. In fact, it soon became the
dominant topic for debate. In contrast to the open atmo-
sphere in the experimental platform, however, communication
in the higher platform soon took the form of accusations and
counter-accusations. Native leaders started to blame the
migrants for the occurrence of soil degradation, and migrants
responded by uttering grievances regarding limited land
security. On several occasions tensions rose high, and I was
not successful in redressing this pattern of exchange. After
the fourth meeting of the higher-level platform, the Wala
leader came to see me and requested that the discussions on
the land tenure be discontinued. His argument was that if the
discussions continued, the community leaders would design
rules to regulate their access to land, and if they were not
able to follow those rules it would worsen their already sour
relationships with the native community. I agreed to do this
in order to not jeopardize my other work and relations with
the various communities.
Analysis and discussion of findings in stage 1
The fact that discussions on land tenure had to be aborted in
the platforms can be attributed to several factors. In retro-
spect, it was probably a major strategic error to shift the
discussions on land tenure from the experimental platform
to the higher-level platform at an early stage in the process.
For several reasons this platform was far less suited for
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discussing such a sensitive issue. People in the platform
lacked the collaborative experience of joint experimenta-
tion accompanied with intensive informal interaction in the
field. Hence, they did not know each other well at a personal
level, and had little common experience other than having
gone through previous conflicts that had caused the rela-
tions between Walas and Bonos to be damaged. As Steins
and Edwards (1999) argue, productive platform dynamics
depend in part on the quality of social relationships.
Moreover, the platform involved community leaders and
meetings were held in public with at times a large audience.
As has been argued by Mutimukuri and Leeuwis (2004)
such public meetings provide limited opportunities for the
kind of ‘‘give and take’’ that is necessary for settling dis-
putes. Rather they provide an environment in which leaders
like to manifest themselves, show strength and rally for
support. In addition, I was far from an experienced facili-
tator and hence lacked the methodological skill to
counteract the dynamics that emerged.
Lack of mutually felt interdependence and urgency may
also have negatively affected the dynamics in the platforms.
Several authors point to the importance of these factors in
securing productive learning and negotiation processes
(Fisher and Ury 1981; Mastenbroek 1997; Aarts 1998;
Leeuwis 2000; Leeuwis and Van Den Ban 2004). As Walas
regard their stay in Wenchi as temporary, maintaining good
relations with the natives is not the highest priority. More-
over, Walas have other options for accessing land such as
the taungya system or relocating to another community
when the soils on which they farm become degraded. In
addition, there tend to be sufficient Bonos who are still
willing to rent out land in view of immediate cash needs
associated with events such as funerals, court cases, house
building or health related costs, even if they know this
might lead to declining soil fertility (see also Adjei-Nsiah
et al. 2007a). Apparently, Bonos in these respects depend
more on the Walas than the other way around. This unequal
dependence is to the advantage of the Walas. For them, the
higher-level platform at some point presented the risk of
Bonos becoming better organized among themselves, which
might allow them to take firmer action against soil mining.
Not surprisingly, therefore, Walas became less enthusiastic
about negotiating land tenure in the platform.
Stage 2: Experimentation with alternative land tenure
arrangements by individual farmers
Research approach and methods in stage 2
After the failure of the platform process, efforts to support
the development of new tenure arrangements shifted to the
level of individual landowners and tenants. This was
possible since several farmers in the experimental plat-
form had indicated that they would like to experiment with
new arrangements. Two landowners and two migrants
‘‘designed’’ (i.e., negotiated) an alternative tenure arrange-
ment in close collaboration with me. I also closely
monitored the implementation of the arrangement by hav-
ing regular contact and discussions with both parties
involved. My interest was to find out whether the experi-
ments would indeed allow for more sustainable cropping
systems, and which factors would influence their success or
failure. After the ending of the ‘‘experiments,’’ I evaluated
the contract with the landowners and tenants involved by
means of an interview. In addition, the basic design of the
alternative tenure arrangements was explained to five sep-
arate focus groups whereby details from case 1 (described
below) were used as an example. Subsequently, the groups
were asked to discuss the alternative arrangement and rank
it against more common tenure arrangements. The focus
groups were composed along ethnic lines and the participants
coincided largely with the members of the experimental
platform.
Results in stage 2: Alternative designs meet with family
dynamics
One of the main reasons why tenants were not willing to
invest in soil fertility management was payment of high
rent which had to be made in advance. The alternative
arrangements that were negotiated between the two pairs of
farmers had in common that payment of rent was delayed
until after the harvest and took the form of a fixed amount
of produce (or its cash equivalent). In addition, both
arrangements included agreements with regard to the crops
to be grown. No specific time frame was included in the
arrangements (in Wenchi this tends to happen only when
advance payment is involved). However, the expectation of
both farmers and myself was that the subsequent payment
and agreement about cropping systems would result in
greater satisfaction for both parties involved. Such mutual
satisfaction, then, might form the basis for longer term
contracts in the future, as an important condition to soil
fertility improvement.
Case 1: Alternative land tenure contract involving a Wala
migrant and an elderly landlady. The tenant is a 36-year-
old migrant (Wala) from Wa in the upper west region of
Ghana. He had stayed in Beposo, a farming community in
Wenchi for the past 12 years. Prior to the new contract,
the migrant had engaged in a share contract for one year with
the 75-year-old native landlady. Under the share contract the
migrant grew maize on 1.2 ha and cassava on 0.4 ha of land.
The cassava was shared equally between the two parties
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while the maize was shared in a ratio of 1:2 with the landlady
taking one portion while the tenant took the remaining two
portions. At the end of the share contract, the tenant decided
to abrogate the contract and search for another land where he
could engage in a different contract because the yield he
obtained was not commensurate with the amount of labor
and resources he had invested in the land.
A son of the landowner who did not want the tenant to
leave the land asked him to propose an alternative
arrangement which he thought would be beneficial to him
(the migrant). The tenant then suggested that he would crop
1.2 ha of the land to maize and give four bags (two bags
each in the major and the minor growing seasons) of the
produce to the landowner either in kind or in cash at
the prevailing market price. Under this new arrangement,
the tenant was responsible for harvesting, shelling, and
transporting the produce home. He would cultivate the
remaining portion of the plot (about 0.4 ha) to cassava as a
soil fertility regenerating strategy, the produce of which
was to be shared equally between him and the landowner.
The son of the landowner consequently informed the
mother who agreed and came to the tenant’s house for the
contract to be formalized.
In the presence of the tenant’s wife, the owner of the
house where he (the tenant) resided with another migrant
farmer, the agreement was formalized orally. None of the
children of the landowner were, however present. In order
to secure the contract, the tenant later asked the landowner
to put the contract into writing. However, the landowner
objected to this suggestion and said that the oral contract in
the presence of the three witnesses was enough. The
landowner explained that she did not want a written con-
tract because of the cost implication; in the prevailing
tenure system, landowners are responsible for the payment
of the cost involved in documenting a contract.
At the end of the major cropping season, the tenant
realized 16 bags of maize from the 1.2 ha he cropped. He
consequently gave the landowner three hundred thousand
cedis (US$33.3) a cash equivalent of two bags of maize
each weighing 100 kg, which the woman accepted and for
which she thanked him.
In the minor season, the tenant cropped the land to maize.
A month later, a daughter of the landowner went to the field.
When she came home she asked her mother about the tenant
and contract. Upon hearing of the details of the contract, she
objected to the contract in which the tenant was to provide
the mother with two bags of maize every season and asked
the mother to go and renegotiate with the tenant. Looking at
the performance of the maize in the field, the daughter
expected that the tenant was going to have a good harvest
and therefore felt that giving the mother only two bags of
maize was not enough. The landlady then went back to the
tenant and demanded that she should be given a third of the
produce from the minor season maize crop instead of two
bags of maize because the current arrangement was unfair.
The tenant rejected the new demand. Consequently the
landlady summoned the tenant before some members of the
village unit committee to persuade him to give her a third of
the maize produce instead of giving her two bags. When the
witnesses were called in, they testified that the tenant was
supposed to provide the landowner with four bags of maize
(two bags each in the minor and major seasons). The
committee members therefore asked the tenant to provide
the landlady with the remaining two bags after harvesting
the minor season crop.
Not satisfied with the ruling by the unit committee, the
landlady threatened the tenant with a court action. The
tenant consequently informed me of the affair and asked
me to accompany him to the landowner and discuss with
the family how to resolve the issue. After discussions with
the landowner she agreed to take the two bags of maize as
agreed originally, but made it clear that she would prefer to
go back to sharecropping the next season.
At the beginning of the second year, the landowner told
the tenant that she would like them to revert to the share
contract, and the tenant obliged. However, this time the
tenant decided to crop only 0.8 ha instead of the 1.2 ha.
Later, the tenant confided in me that if the woman insisted
on the share contract he would cheat her. What he planned
to do was to divide the produce into two after harvest and
then hide half and declare the remaining half for sharing, a
trick which some tenant farmers have been playing on their
landowners. The landowner was an old lady who can
hardly walk. The distance from her home to the field was
about 11 km and her children also did not frequent this area
because of the distance. Upon hearing this, I went back to
the landowner with the tenant and assisted in negotiating
with her in the presence of her eldest daughter after which
they agreed again to the alternative arrangement.
At the end of the major cropping season the tenant
harvested 12 bags of maize. As agreed, he gave a cash
equivalent of two bags of maize which was ¢440, 000
(US$49) to the landowner. After collecting the money,
other relatives of the landowner (who share a boundary
with the tenant) informed the landlady that the tenant
harvested a truck load of maize and therefore the two bags
of maize he gave to her did not measure up to the quantity
of maize harvested. The landlady upon hearing this decided
to end the contract at the end of the second year.
Case 2: Alternative land tenure contract involving a
migrant (Dagarba) and a landlord. The migrant involved in
this contract was a 28-year-old Dagarba who had stayed in
Wenchi for two years. During his first year stay he engaged
in a share contract with a native but was not satisfied with the
arrangement at the end of the first cropping year.
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He approached another landlord (age 42) and asked if
he could rent all of his six ha of land. Since he had no
money to pay for an advance rent (as is usually the case),
he negotiated with the landlord to allow him to crop and
pay later at the end of the first cropping season. The
landlord, however, was afraid that the tenant might not
pay if there was a crop failure. He therefore proposed an
alternative arrangement to the migrant which would not
involve an upfront payment of rent. The landlord first
asked the tenant the minimum amount of bags of maize
he (the tenant) expected to get when he crops all the six
ha of land in one growing season. The tenant mentioned
30 bags of maize. The landlord therefore requested the
tenant to give him nine bags of maize every year to be
paid in two installments of five and four bags in the major
and minor seasons, respectively. Under the contract, the
landlord mentioned that he would reduce the number of
bags to be paid only when there is a crop failure as a
result of drought. To encourage the tenant to improve the
fertility of the soil it was agreed that during the minor
season the tenant would intercrop half of the maize field
with cassava, the produce of which would be shared
equally between the two parties. If the tenant decided to
crop the land only once in a year he would have to pay
the full rent in the form of maize. The contract would be
renewed after one year if both parties were satisfied. The
tenant indicated that if the contract becomes successful,
he would plant other crops such as groundnut, cowpea,
and cassava to ensure sustainable use of the land and still
pay the rent in the form of the maize.
The contract was to be put into writing at the beginning
of the cropping season before the tenant started cropping.
Each party to the contract was to provide three people to
witness the contract. When the landlord informed his eldest
son of the proposed contract, he objected to it. He
explained that giving all six ha to the tenant would deny
him (the son) access to land for farming. The landlord,
however, ignored his son and went ahead and gave the land
to the tenant without putting the contract in writing.
On the day that the tenant was to begin clearing the land,
the son of the landlord went to the house of the tenant and
warned him not to step on the land. Afraid of the threat,
the tenant decided not to go ahead with cropping the land.
He did not however inform the landowner of the action
of his son.
Evaluation of the experiment by the parties involved
as well as different ethnic groups
The fact that one contract never materialized in practice,
and that the other was discontinued after two years, might
easily lead to the conclusion that both experiments were a
‘‘failure.’’ As we will argue in the next section, the reasons
for this failure have more to do with intra-family dynamics
than with the contents of the contract per se. In this section,
we report on the evaluation of the contracts purely in terms
of how different parties and communities evaluate the
distribution of gains and losses involved. In doing so, we
draw mainly on the outcomes of the first case.
From a purely economic perspective, the tenants and
landowners involved in both cases remain positive about
the design of the alternative contract when compared with
other arrangements such as sharecropping and land renting
(see Table 1).
The information in the table was obtained from the
landowner and the tenant farmer. The yield figures under
the new arrangement refer to the actual yields obtained
under this particular new land tenure arrangement. The
yield figures for the share cropping and the land renting
arrangements refer to the amount of produce the tenant and
the landowner would have obtained theoretically (based on
what each party is expected to get under each of these
arrangements) if both parties had entered into any of these
arrangements instead of the new land tenure arrangement.
The tenant involved in case 1 argued that he did not
have the financial capital to pay for an advance rent of
US$28 per ha per year. The money that was to be used for
the payment of rent could instead be used to hire labor to
prepare the land for planting. The tenant obtained 16 bags
in the major growing season and another 12 bags in the
minor growing season from the 1.2 ha plot. Out of these, he
gave four bags to the landlady and the rest (24 bags)
became his. He argued that if he shared the produce with
the landowner on the basis of 2:1, which is the normal
practice with sharecropping, he would only obtain about 18
bags while the landlady would in theory get nine bags.
The landowner herself was satisfied with the arrange-
ment because she would get money twice in a year instead
of once in two years when the land is rented for two years.
In Wenchi, land is normally rented out at US$28 per ha per
year which means that the landlady gets about US$33.6 in
one year when she rents out her 1.2 ha plot. However,
under the alternative arrangement she would get US$ 77.7
from her share of four bags of maize in the first year
(US$33.3 and US$44.4 from two bags of maize each in the
major and minor season, respectively) (see Table 1).
Although with sharecropping the landlady would in theory
get nine bags of maize (instead of four, see Table 1), the
landlady realizes that this option also has disadvantages.
First of all, she incurs transportation and shelling costs. She
is also aware of the risk of being cheated in the sharing of
farm produce by the tenant since she lives about 11 km
away from the farm and cannot frequent there. In share-
cropping, the tenant usually shares the produce, often in the
absence of the landlord. The tenant takes his share first and
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leaves the landowner’s share in the field. In addition, the
landlady reports that, depending on the circumstances, she
may lose up to 50% of the produce due to pests, animals or
spoiling in the field. On these grounds, the landlady too
continues to feel that the contract is beneficial in principle.
Other interviews and stories narrated by community
members also suggest that the returns a landlord gets from
sharecropping may be far lower than it would be in theory
(see Tables 1, 2).
The various ethnic groups (the Bonos, Walas, Mossi,
Dagarbas, and Lobis) in the communities were asked as
well to evaluate the alternative arrangement from case 1 by
comparing it with more common arrangements like share-
cropping and land renting. The Bonos (N = 15), Walas
(N = 12), and Dagarbas (N = 10) interviewed were all part
of the experimental platform except five of the Dagarbas
while the Lobis (N = 6) and Mossi (N = 10) were not.
The Bonos who are the landowners ranked the new
arrangement as the best arrangement and sharecropping as
the worst arrangement. They argued that since at the time of
the contract, one ha of land was being rented at ¢250,000
(US$28), the landowner could have obtained only ¢300,000
(US$33.3), if she had rented the 1.2 ha to the tenant.
However, with this new arrangement she earned as much as
¢700,000 (US$77.7), about ¢400,000 (US$44.4) more than
what she would have earned if she had rented it out.
Moreover in case of crop failure due to drought the tenant
was obliged to pay the four bags of maize as stipulated in
the contract. Again, they argued that, if the land had been
given out for share contract, the farmer could not have
obtained more than two bags of maize due to cheating by
tenant farmers.
The Dagarbas ranked the new arrangement as the most
preferred arrangement and sharecropping as the least pre-
ferred arrangement. They argued that with this new
arrangement, tenants do not have to worry about the
problem of having to pay for advance rent before one can
start cultivating the land. Thus this arrangement makes it
possible for tenants with no financial capital to rent land for
farming purposes. Moreover tenants could consume any
quantity of the crop on the field while it is yet to be shared
without having conflict with the landowner.
Walas and Mossi ranked the alternative arrangement as
second to land renting. Because of the many problems
associated with sharecropping, such as conflict over sharing
of farm produce, these farmers argue that this alternative
arrangement in which rent is paid in the form of farm
produce and at crop harvest is a relief for tenants who do not
have money to pay for advance rent. Since the tenant is also
not obliged to share the produce with the landowner, he
could also consume any portion of the produce at any point
in time without incurring the displeasure of the landowner.
Table 1 Estimated theoretical benefits accruing to landowners and tenant farmers from 1.2 ha under different land tenure arrangements in (1)
major cropping season, (2) minor cropping season, and (3) major and minor cropping seasons combined in 2004 in Wenchi
Land tenure arrangement No. of bags of maize obtained Post harvest costa (US$)1 Total revenue (US$) Net revenueb (US$)
Tenant Land-owner Tenant Land-owner Tenant Land-owner Tenant Land-owner
a) Major cropping season2
Sharecropping 10.7 5.3 18.3 14.1 177.3 88.3 159.5 74.1*
Rent 16.0 – 32.4 – 250.0c 16.7 217.6 16.7
New arrangement 14.0 2.0 32.4 – 233.3 33.3 200.9 33.3
b) Minor cropping season3
Sharecropping 8.0 4.0 16.2 12.0 177.8 88.8 161.6 76.8*
Rent 12.0 – 28.0 – 250.0c 16.7 222.0 16.7
New arrangement 10.0 2.0 28.0 – 222.2 44.4 194.2 44.4
c) Major and minor cropping season combined
Sharecropping 18.7 9.3 34.5 26.1 355.1 177.1 320.6 151.0*
Rent 28.0 – 60.4 – 500.0 33.6 439.6 33.4
New arrangement 24 4.0 60.4 – 455.5 77.7 395.1 77.7
a Includes transportation cost from the field, de-husking and shelling cost
b Tenant farmer’s field operational costs have not been deducted
c Cost of land rent has been deducted
1 Exchange rate is ¢9000/US$1
2 Maize was sold at US$16.7/100 kg bag
3 Maize was sold at US$22.2/100 kg bag
*In theory this is what should happen but in practice there are risks that reduce revenue for landlords as is illustrated by arguments forwarded by
the landlady in case 1 and additional cases reported in Table 2
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The worry expressed by Walas and Mossi, however, is the
risk of crop failure in time of drought. Under this arrange-
ment, risk is not shared between the tenant and the landlord
as happens in sharecropping. Thus, while profit is enjoyed
by both landlord and tenant, risk is borne solely by the
tenant and in a period of crop failure, the tenant is obliged to
provide the landowner with his share of the farm produce.
Lobis ranked land renting as the most preferred
arrangement and the alternative arrangement as the least
preferred arrangement. They reason that under the new
arrangement, risk is only borne by the tenant unlike
sharecropping where risk is shared between the landowner
and the tenant farmer.
Analysis and discussion of findings in stage 2
It transpires from the rankings and surrounding argumen-
tations that, in principle, the alternative arrangement meets
with considerable sympathy. While the landowning Bonos
rank the arrangement first, the valuation among migrants
varies. This is likely to be associated with differential
positions in terms of access to cash and pre-existing land-
security (Adjei-Nsiah et al. 2007a). While relatively well-
off migrant tenants like the Walas prefer the land rental
arrangement, poorer migrants like the Dagarbas prefer the
alternative arrangement which does not involve advance
payment of rent. Moreover, the earliest migrant groups
who have developed cordial relationships with Bonos (e.g.,
Mossi and Lobis) are quite satisfied with the existing
arrangements which in their case tend to be more stable and
less conflict ridden (Adjei-Nsiah et al. 2007a). Thus, for
them the alternative arrangement may have fewer added
values. Thus, the alternative arrangement seems to offer
opportunities especially for poorer landless farmers who
cannot afford advance rent payment to access land for
farming. Although the arrangement may have positive
implications in terms of soil fertility maintenance (i.e., it
may allow the use of more favorable cropping systems
from a soil fertility point of view, see Adjei-Nsiah et al.
2007b), it is unlikely that the wealthier Walas (i.e., the
migrant category that is held most responsible for soil
mining by the natives) will voluntarily work with the
alternative arrangement on a large scale. In sum, the
evaluation of the alternative arrangement in comparison
with other arrangements such as sharecropping and land
rental indicates that farmers from different ethnic groups
have different preferences, depending mainly on their
financial position and the quality of their relationships with
the native landlords. Other factors, such as willingness and/
or capacity to take risks have not been investigated, but
may well play a role as well.
An important lesson to be drawn from stage 2, however,
is that the contents of the alternative contract are less
important than relational issues of various kinds. Even if
many people like the new arrangement, it does not seem to
work well due to intra-family dynamics and ambiguities. In
both cases, the agreements reached between migrants and
landowners do not survive due to the circumstance that
other family members (in these cases children) contest the
agreement arrived at. The children claimed that their access
and interests are jeopardized by the contract, and/or that
they have not been properly consulted in the negotiations.
In both cases, the landowning contract parties initially did
not involve their family members in the negotiations, and
neither do they inform them about it. The children involved
believe that this is to prevent them from sharing in the
benefits of the contract.
My own experience as well as further investigations in
the community suggests that the problems experienced in
the two cases are not isolated incidents. When I rented a
piece of land to carry out experiments with the experi-
mental platform, the contract was disputed by a nephew of
the landlord who claimed he needed it for farming. This
happened despite the fact that there was a written contract.
Although, I could have taken action against the landowner,
I decided not to do so because of its implications for my
subsequent work with the community. Interviews with
Table 2 Two examples of the risk of revenue reduction for landlords in sharecropping
A tenant in urgent need for cash
A forty-nine-year-old landlord loaned his 1.2 ha land to a migrant tenant to cultivate maize on share contract basis. At the end of the cropping
season, the tenant gave the landlord only two bowls of maize weighing less than 20 kg, when the landlord requested for his share of the
produce. When the landowner sent him before an arbitration body, the tenant pleaded guilty and explained that he sold the maize to enable him
to get money to send his sick child to the hospital.
A tenant attempts to cheat the landlord
A thirty-five-year-old landowner gave his 1.6 ha land to a migrant tenant to cultivate maize for sharing. When the maize was ready for sharing,
the tenant harvested the maize but before he informed the landowner to come for his share of the produce, he had divided the produce into two,
hidden one-half of it in a nearby bush, and declared only the remaining half for sharing. When the landlord arrived in the field, he suspected
that the tenant had not declared all the produce. He therefore decided to search the nearby bush and indeed found a heap of maize that had been
hidden by the tenant. When the landlord threatened the tenant with a police arrest, the latter bolted and was never seen in the community
afterwards.
398 S. Adjei-Nsiah et al.
123
tenants and village authorities revealed that younger family
members rent out land regularly without the consent of the
family head, which resulted in tenants being denied access
to the land after having paid rent, or having to leave the
land before expiration of the contract. In other cases,
contracts were being challenged by family members after
the death of the landlord. Similar to what happened in case
1, it is not uncommon for landowners to take back a plot of
land before the rent expires, and re-rent it again for a higher
price. This is especially when the landowner (or his family)
observes that the tenant has had a bumper harvest in the
previous season.
At first glance one might interpret the kind of dynamics
portrayed simply as cheating both within native families,
and between landlords and tenants. However, while self-
interest, jealousy, and an apprehension about sharing reve-
nues undoubtedly play a role, such practices must be
understood in the context of wider struggles for resources,
institutional configurations, and ambiguities. As Berry
(1997, 2002) has indicated, access to land in this region
of Ghana is closely intertwined with whether one can suc-
cessfully claim to belong to a particular family or not, which
already goes along with considerable ambiguity and space
for negotiation. This is further complicated by the fact that
different inheritance systems may apply to pieces of land
with different histories, which again enlarges the space for
contestation. The natives in Wenchi have a matrilineal
inheritance system, which implies that children inherit
resources acquired from the family through their mother and
uncle; respectively those family resources accumulated or
invested in by a male native are inherited by the children of
his sisters, and not by his own children. Thus, children can
only benefit from such resources as long as their fathers are
alive. Some males respond to this by acquiring individual
lands (e.g., by entering into a share contract or by buying
land from other families) as resources generated and/or
acquired through this route cannot be claimed back by the
family and can be passed on to their own children (Amanor
and Diderutuah 2001). All this implies that the question as to
who has a legitimate claim to a piece of land depends to a
large extent on family history, the history of land-use and
land-acquisition, including the history of how resources to
buy ‘‘individual’’ lands were generated. Such histories are
often not transparent and leave considerable room for
interpretation and negotiation, which is why historical nar-
ratives play such an important role in land disputes (Berry
1997, 2002).
Returning to the experiment with new land-tenure
arrangement contracts, we can conclude that these efforts
failed largely due to the fact that it is simply not clear and
transparent with whom such contracts should be made in
the first place. This situation suggests that when there is
ambiguity in tenure, it becomes difficult for people to
experiment with new contractual arrangements. Ambigui-
ties in tenure are complicated further by another source of
uncertainty that is inherent to agricultural production,
namely the variable climate and ecological conditions that
influence production levels. In one of the experiments (case
1), dissatisfaction on the side of the (family of the) land-
lady arose in particular when the tenant was observed to
have a particularly good harvest. A weakness of the con-
tract arrangement was that—unlike sharecropping—it did
not have an inbuilt provision to adjust payment to the
revenue obtained. It would be interesting to explore whe-
ther more flexible contracts could help to ameliorate
disputes around rented land. Such an arrangement would be
somewhere in between conventional sharecropping and
conventional land renting, and seek to combine favorable
aspects of share-cropping (e.g., adapting payment to rev-
enue, ex-post payment, agreement about cropping systems)
with those of land renting (e.g., clarity about payment,
allowing continuous harvesting, ease of preventing post-
harvest losses, less liable to cheating) while avoiding
associated weaknesses.
Stage 3: Exploring institutional arrangements
to deal with ambiguity
Research approach and methods in stage 3
The findings in stage 2 led again to a shift in efforts. It
became clear that a better understanding was needed of how
people deal with ambiguities in land-tenure, which institu-
tions exist to reduce uncertainties and risks surrounding
tenure arrangements, and how such institutions could be
strengthened. I conducted informal interviews with key
informants such as community leaders and so-called ‘‘letter
writers’’ and ‘‘commissioners of oaths’’ who were found to
play a role in formalizing contracts. Two community
leaders, three letter writers, and one commissioner of oaths
were interviewed. Subsequently, a survey was conducted
among 33 tenants to find out how many tenants had written
contracts. This was done by first using snowball technique
to make a complete list of all migrants in the three com-
munities and their tenancy status. From the list, all tenant
farmers who rent land were interviewed to find out whether
they had written contracts or not.
Results in stage 3: Increased use of written contracts
The key informants all signaled that, as a response to the
numerous land disputes occurring, many tenants are now
interested in written contracts as a means of formalizing
and securing their agreements with landlords. The survey
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carried out subsequently among tenant farmers indicated
that in 2005, 13 out of 33 had written contracts. Key
informants claimed that this figure is considerably higher
than in previous years. Tenants indicated that they resort to
written contracts especially when the contract exceeds one
year and/or involves a large sum of money. When trust
develops gradually between the landlord and tenant after
two contract terms or so, subsequent contracts are some-
times made without documentation. It is relevant to note
that in the research area written contracts are only drawn up
for land renting, and not for sharecropping or other tenure
arrangements.
Contracts are made between the landowner and the
tenant farmer and, according to respondents, should be
witnessed by at least two people provided by each of the
parties. Preferably the witness of the landowner should be a
close relative of the landowner who would be in a position
to challenge the validity of the contract. Such a person
could be the eldest son or daughter of the landowner in the
case of private land, or a nephew, a sibling or a family head
in the case of family land. However, as one of the earlier
cases demonstrates, this does not always happen as land-
owners may well be reluctant to let close relatives know of
contracts made. Instead, some landowners solicit the
assistance of people outside the family with no right in the
land to witness the contract.
Typically, written contracts indicate the land area, the
location of the land, and the duration of the contract; the
documents include names and thumbprints or signatures of
landowner, tenant, and their witnesses. Both the tenant and
landowner receive a copy. The documents are kept at a
secure place and produced before an arbitration authority
when the contract is disputed.
In Wenchi, written contracts are not validated by public
officials or local authorities (as reported elsewhere by
Lavigne Delville 2003). Institutions that do play an impor-
tant role in preparing and documenting contracts in Wenchi
are so-called letter writers and commissioners of oaths.
Commissioners of oaths are normally retired civil servants
(e.g. police officers, teachers, court registrars, etc.) who are
licensed or registered to prepare official written documents
(such as contracts and wills) for individuals for a fee, and are
usually located in larger towns. Letter writers tend to be
individuals who operate secretarial businesses in smaller
communities for a fee. Contracts prepared by commissioners
of oaths have official legal backing while contracts prepared
by letter writers normally do not, unless the letter writer is
licensed to perform specific tasks. Two commissioners of
oaths are located in Wenchi district, while several letter
writers are located in the communities. Reportedly, their
number has grown in recent years; in Beposo village alone
there are three letter writers. As the commissioners of oaths
charge higher fees and are only located in Wenchi, most
people prefer the services of the letter writers. It is usual that
the party who receives money pays for the preparation of the
contract, which simultaneously serves as a kind of ‘‘receipt’’
for the paying party. Thus, the cost of putting the contract on
paper is borne by the landowner only, which sometimes
deters them from engaging in written contracts. Some tenant
farmers are, however, willing to pay for the cost when the
landowner is unwilling to do so.
In addition to preparing the contracts, commissioners of
oaths and letter writers frequently serve as principal wit-
nesses during land disputes. Such disputes are often
brought before unit committees and/or community elders.
The unit committees are local government structures which
operate at the community level. The community elders who
constitute the traditional authority are made up of the chief
and his elders. An aggrieved individual in a land dispute
may decide to send the case to any of the two bodies,
depending on where she or he thinks the case may receive a
fair hearing. These two bodies serve as the main arbitration
bodies in the communities who settle land disputes at the
local level. Despite the important roles that they play, their
decisions are never binding. A person who does not trust
the fairness of the two bodies or feels aggrieved by a
decision may decide to seek redress at a district magistrate
court or even at a higher court.
Analysis and discussion of findings in stage 3
The increased use of written documents to secure and
formalize contracts has also been reported by others and
elsewhere in Africa (Lavigne Delville 2003; Lavigne
Delville et al. 2001; Amanor and Diderutuah 2001). The
emergence of this alternative way of dealing with land
tenure agreements can be interpreted as a local response to
changing socio-economic circumstances, including increased
pressure on the land as well as frequent tension between
natives and migrants concerning land tenure. It shows that
local actors engage actively in solving problems, in this case
by developing institutional innovations (Lavigne Delville
2003) in the form of written contracts for land renting and
associated rules and procedures, as well as the growth in
the numbers of service providers. These developments
demonstrate the self-organizational capacity of local actors
in bringing about institutional innovations in land tenure
systems where current arrangements for managing conflict
are no longer sufficient (see also Le Meur 2002).
However, the current institutional innovation that we
have observed did not solve all problems around land tenure
in Wenchi. As we have seen, written contracts in Wenchi
are only used for land renting and tend to be restricted to
contracts that involve money. For example, they do not
cover sharecropping even if such share crop arrangements
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go along with considerable tensions as well, especially
regarding the sharing of produce. Written sharecrop con-
tracts are reportedly common in the citrus and oil palm belt
of the Eastern region of Ghana (Amanor and Diderutuah
2001). In addition, a written contract alone is not an abso-
lute guarantee of tenure security. When not witnessed by the
right persons, the contract can be successfully challenged.
With the situation that I experienced (see stage 2), neither of
the two witnesses to the contract was a close relative of the
landowner. Even if written contracts may enhance trans-
parency on what is agreed upon and may contribute to
relevant family members being informed about them (as
witnesses or otherwise), the ambiguities around land tenure
are such that disputes still arise easily. And when such
disputes arise, tenants often hesitate to strain their rela-
tionships with their communities of residence by engaging
them in legal battles which may be expensive, time con-
suming, and sometimes run into years. Finally, the securing
of a written contract requires the consent of all parties, and
tenants in particular are not always in a position to persuade
native landlords to co-operate.
In all, we see that local actors have already worked
towards new institutional arrangements that may contribute
to reduction of uncertainties and conflict around land ten-
ure. However, there is still considerable scope for the
further development of such innovations. Possibilities in
this respect may include (1) the development of written
contracts that somehow make sharecropping less vulnera-
ble; (2) contractual provisions for renting that create a link
between the level of rent and the level of revenue obtained;
(3) clear and agreed upon rules as to who can contract out
what land and who should be involved as witnesses to
make a contract valid; (4) mechanisms for parties to find
out what the status of particular lands and landlords is vis-
a`-vis such rules; (5) increased involvement of local
authorities in validating contracts; (6) better licensing and/
or certification of letter writers; and (7) strengthening
customary and local institutions to manage land related
conflicts at the local level. These are just examples of
possible strategies that may be pursued.
Conclusion
We have reported on a long action research journey in the
social realm that began when our 2002–2003 diagnostic
study (Adjei-Nsiah et al. 2004) suggested that we needed
to work on alternative land tenure arrangements if we
wanted to contribute to the creation of better conditions for
soil fertility improvement. Our initial approach was to
bring stakeholders together in a platform to engage in the
collaborative design of new arrangements. These efforts
were stranded mainly because conditions conducive for
learning and negotiation appeared to be lacking. We then
proceeded with supporting experimentation with new kinds
of tenure arrangements between individual landlords and
tenants. Although the type of arrangement experimented
with was appreciated in principle by some groups of
farmers, many problems occurred during the implementa-
tion. While we had worked on the contents of the contracts,
more pressing problems appeared to be associated with
ambiguities regarding who is to be involved in contracts in
the first place. In the final stage of the journey, we set out to
gain a better understanding on how such ambiguities could
be tackled and found that local actors themselves had
already made some progress in working towards institu-
tional innovations without us noticing initially. Specifically,
we discovered that local actors had established institutions
that tend to reduce uncertainties and risks associated with
land tenure arrangements. These include increased use of
written contracts and mechanisms for dealing with land
tenure conflicts such as the setting up of bodies at the
local level to arbitrate in land issues. However, these
institutional innovations only covered land tenure arrange-
ments involving money transfers (and not sharecropping)
and were still affected negatively by ambiguities in enti-
tlement to land, resulting in lack of clarity about who would
be legitimate witnesses and unavailability of licensed offi-
cials to validate contracts. This suggested that we might
have better oriented our action research to developing
solutions for such problems.
One could say that, in a sense, we have ‘‘missed the
point’’ repeatedly during our action research, despite the
fact that we—and the program of which we were part—
deliberately invested considerable time and effort in so-
called ‘‘diagnostic studies’’ (see Ro¨ling et al. 2004). In
other words, we made several assumptions and/or ‘‘pre-
analytical choices’’ (see Ro¨ling et al. 2004) that proved
misguided in retrospect. It must be acknowledged that
some of these problems could have been avoided if we had
delved earlier into the existing social science literature on,
for example, ethnic diversity, migration patterns, ambiguity
in land tenure, and multi-stakeholder platforms, and if we
had integrated such insights in the design of alternative
arrangements beforehand. To allow for such a more
intensive and prolonged social science exploration and
diagnosis, it would have been better if we had worked with
an inter-disciplinary team of researchers in the field,
instead of with an individual (and mainly technically
trained) PhD student with an inter-disciplinarily group of
supervisors ‘‘at a distance.’’ Moreover, we feel that our
diagnostic activities at the field level should have been
more geared towards identifying local initiatives and
responses to problems, rather than to getting a better
understanding of different problem perspectives only. Such
a way of carrying out the research would probably have led
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to a quicker understanding of the complexity of the situa-
tion. However, we want to argue still that ‘‘missing the
point’’ at times is inevitable when engaging in (action)
research, and that the recognition of it is in fact a sign of
learning and progress. If researchers want to contribute to
change and development and to engage with communities,
they need to start somewhere and find an entry point on
which local actors are willing and motivated to work. In
this case, the initial entry point was ‘‘optimizing locally
developed technical strategies for dealing with soil fertil-
ity.’’ Sustained critical reflection and diagnosis during
collaborative technical experimentation with farmers led to
progressive insight and greater attention for the social
realm. Although unanticipated problems and even conflicts
occurred in the effort to address social issues, these were
functional in that they led to sharper problem definitions
and new courses of action, not only on the side of the
researcher, but also on the side of societal stakeholders.
Change and innovation processes eventually depend on
action, and action is a critical condition for and component
of learning (Kolb 1984; Leeuwis and Van Den Ban 2004).
In complex situations, it is fundamentally impossible for
a researcher to come in with a full understanding of the
situation, and even if we had come in better prepared (and/
or with a team) and started the action research differently,
we would have discovered flaws in our thinking, and faced
the need to adapt to the entry points of local actors as well
as to the unpredictable outcomes of social (inter)action. An
important conclusion to be drawn is that action research
requires continuous ‘‘diagnosis’’ and critical reflection on
assumptions and outcomes in order to flexibly steer
research into relevant directions. This requires the delib-
erate organization of moments where stakeholders and
scholars with different disciplinary orientations can give
feedback on preliminary findings, assumptions, and pro-
posed ways forward.
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